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How Creditor Rights Affect the Issuance of Public Debt: The 
Role of Credit Ratings 
Abstract: We propose that credit ratings act as an information channel which, combined 
with more power being given to creditors by countries strengthening creditor rights, leads 
to an increase in the supply of public debt.  From a firm-level dataset covering 51 
developed and developing countries for 1989 through 2013, we find that in countries with 
stronger creditor rights, firms tend to have higher credit ratings. We confirm that in these 
countries, firms with higher credit ratings exhibit a greater issuance of public debt than 
that of equity. As further evidence that credit ratings reduce agency costs of debt, we find 
that improvements in creditor rights and resulting higher credit ratings increase capital 
expenditures among firms experiencing severe bondholder-shareholder conflicts. 
JEL Classification: G31; G32; E22
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21. Introduction
The study examines the relationship between creditor rights, credit ratings and the 
issuance of public debt. There is an extensive literature on the association between creditor 
rights and private debt. Research shows that protections offered by the legal system to 
creditors lead to an increase in the level of private credit (LLSV, 1998; Djankov et al., 
2007). Less well-understood is the effect of stronger creditor rights on arms’ length public 
debt. Unlike banks, atomistic bondholders cannot effectively coordinate with one another 
to monitor a firm. The importance of studying the impact of creditor rights on different 
forms of debt is bolstered by evidence in Rauh and Sufi (2010) that lower quality firms 
have significant levels of debt heterogeneity in their capital structures. We examine 
whether stronger creditor rights are sufficient to overcome information asymmetries 
between shareholders and bondholders such that firms are encouraged to issue public debt. 
For instance, the bankruptcy code of a country may permit secured creditors to seize 
collateral from a financially distressed firm, but when equity holders engage in asset 
substitution and when public debtholders cannot monitor against such substitution, they 
may be reluctant to lend even when creditor rights are strengthened by law. We propose 
that firm-level credit ratings act as an information channel to mitigate information 
asymmetries between shareholders and bondholders and encourage firms to issue debt 
when country-level creditor rights are strengthened.
Rating agencies specialize in gathering information and evaluating the information 
gathered to provide reliable measures of a firm’s creditworthiness (Millon and Thakor, 
1985). CFOs surveyed by Graham and Harvey (2001) ranked credit ratings as an important 
consideration in setting their debt policies. Kisgen (2006) finds that firms on the cusp of a 
ratings downgrade or upgrade postpone debt issuance, demonstrating the importance of 
3credit ratings in decisions to issue debt. We extend this literature by establishing firm-level 
credit ratings as information channels that translate country-level changes in the strength 
of creditor rights to a firm’s decision to issue public debt. The international evidence given 
in this study has policy implications that extend beyond those of firm-level debt policies. 
Shen, Huang and Hasan (2012) demonstrate that there are significant cross-country 
differences in the assignment of firm-level credit ratings. The results of this study imply 
that countries that are contemplating changes to their bankruptcy codes should take into 
account how cross-country variations in the assignment of credit ratings may affect the 
translation of their bankruptcy laws into firm-level debt policies. 
The economic framework for the study is the notion that the amount of credit extended 
by the financial system to the private sector works is determined through two channels. 
The power theory of credit formalized by Townsend (1979) and Aghion and Bolton (1992) 
suggests that when laws strengthen their power, creditors are more willing to extend credit 
because they have the power to force repayment, to grab collateral or even to gain control 
of a firm. The information theory of credit pioneered by Jaffee and Russel (1976) and 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) suggests that when lenders have more information on borrowers 
(e.g., information on their credit histories), they will be less concerned regarding the 
lemons problem of financing nonviable projects and thus more likely to extend credit. 
Djankov et al. (2007) find that both theories of credit offer significant explanatory power 
in explaining cross-country variations observed in the size of private credit markets. Within 
this economic framework, our study examines whether credit ratings are effective in 
channeling information that public debt holders require to supply credit when the 
bankruptcy code increases the power of creditors. 
4Our empirical study relies on a large dataset covering all rated, nonfinancial firms 
around the globe for 1989 to 2013. We obtain firm-level data from various sources such as 
Compustat and Capital IQ. Our first set of results relates stronger creditor rights to higher 
credit ratings. Such an association is robust when we use different estimation methods 
including ordinary least squares (OLS) and weighted least squares (WLS).  Of the four 
subindices of creditor rights, the subindex that measures whether secured creditors are paid 
first out of liquidation proceeds enters with a significantly positive sign at the 1% level 
followed by the subindex that measures whether creditor consent is required when a debtor 
files for reorganization. 
The second set of results relates creditor rights, bond ratings, and bond issuance. While 
we find that the direct effect of creditor protections on bond issuance is weak, stronger 
creditor protections significantly promote bond issuance relative to equity issuance through 
the information channel.  Heterogenous effects observed show that such impacts through 
the information channel are stronger and more significant in countries with fewer 
information asymmetries. This finding is consistent with that of Gu and Kowalewski 
(2014), who document that bond markets are more developed than equity markets in 
countries with stronger creditor rights relative to shareholder rights.  To address potential 
endogeneity issues, we exploit exogenous shifts to country creditor protection and employ 
a difference-in-difference strategy to further confirm the robustness of the relation between 
creditor rights and debt issuance through the information channel.
The third set of results relates creditor rights, credit ratings, and firm investment policy. 
We find that in countries with more creditor protection, firms with higher bond ratings tend 
to have higher net fixed investments. In further support of our argument that the power and 
5information channels reinforce one another, we find that investments made by firms facing 
higher agency costs respond most strongly to creditor rights.
The results given here are consistent with those of other studies. Harford and Uysal 
(2014) show that rated firms are more likely to undertake acquisitions than nonrated firms. 
Roberts and Sufi (2009) show that the effect of creditor actions on debt policy is strongest 
when the borrower's alternative sources of finance are costly. Mclean et al. (2012) suggest 
that investor protections promote accurate share prices, reduce financial constraints and 
encourage efficient investment. Faulkeder and Peterson (2006) find that firms with a debt 
rating have significantly more leverage. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical 
background and our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data, variables and empirical 
design used. Section 4 discusses our empirical results on creditor rights, credit ratings and 
capital structure and describes our robustness tests. Section 5 further discusses the 
relationship between credit rights, ratings and firm investments. Section 6 presents the 
study’s conclusions. 
2. Hypotheses
The power theory of credit predicts that strong creditor rights should mitigate moral 
hazard by borrowers and lower deadweight costs of liquidation.  Moral hazard is also 
expected to decline when stronger creditor rights create few incentives for managers to 
take risks (Acharya et al., 2011b). The resulting reduction in agency costs reduces the need 
for credit rating agencies to intensively monitor how changes in firm investment and 
financing decisions affect credit quality. The information theory of credit predicts that 
6lower costs of monitoring should result in higher credit ratings. The hypotheses are as 
following. 
Hypothesis 1a: In countries with stronger creditor rights, firms tend to have higher 
credit ratings. 
Hypothesis 1b: Changes in creditor rights are expected to be positively associated 
with changes in credit ratings. 
The next two hypotheses relate creditor rights to bond issuance. Credit rating agencies 
specialize in information gathering. Thus, they provide information on the quality of a firm 
beyond publicly available information (Milon and Thakor, 1985; Boot, Milbourn and 
Schmeits, 2006). Without monitoring provided by credit rating agencies, a firm may suffer 
from "credit rationing" (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), which denotes the inability of a firm to 
raise debt capital during difficult economic periods. In countries with strong creditor rights, 
firms with higher credit ratings have better credit quality. Consequently, the firms’ 
borrowing costs are lower, and they exhibit expansive debt capacities. On the other hand, 
as stronger creditor rights can cause managers to stifle non-opportunistic risk taking, equity 
valuations should be negatively affected (Acharya et al., 2011b). Firms should respond to 
higher bond values and lower equity values by increasing bond issuance relative to equity 
issuance.
Hypothesis 2a: In countries with stronger creditor rights, firms tend to have higher 
ratios of bond issuance to equity issuance. 
Hypothesis 2b: In countries with stronger creditor rights, firms with higher credit 
ratings tend to have higher ratios of bond issuance to equity issuance.
The last set of hypotheses addresses the relationship between creditor rights, credit 
7ratings, and capital expenditure investments made by a firm. Theoretical studies show that 
in the presence of conflicts of interest between creditors and equity-holders, debt 
agreements may limit investment policies made even outside of payment default states 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Aghion and Bolton, 1992). Empirical studies confirm these 
theoretical results. Nini et al. (2009) use a large sample of private credit agreements made 
between banks and public firms and document that conflicts of interest between creditors 
and borrowers have a significant impact on firm investment restrictions, which further spur 
a reduction in firm capital expenditures.  Monitoring provided by credit rating agencies 
mitigates conflicts of interest between equity holders and creditors. Higher credit ratings 
signal lower agency costs arising from asset substitution. Hence, we predict that stronger 
creditor rights and higher credit ratings should encourage firms to invest more in fixed 
assets, which are less risky than other risk-shifting investments, such as M&A activities. 
Hypothesis 3a: In countries with stronger creditor rights, firms with higher credit 
ratings tend to make more fixed-asset investments. 
Hypothesis 3b: Improvements in creditor rights and credit ratings promote capital 
expenditures more significantly for firms facing severe bondholder-stockholder 
problems. 
3. Data, variables and empirical methodologies
3.1 Sample construction
To investigate the effect of creditor rights on firms' decisions on financing and 
investments via credit ratings we assemble a large international dataset on creditor rights, 
credit ratings, capital structures and investments from different sources. In turn, we use 
16,855 firm-year observations from 1,331 public firms covering 51 developed and 
8developing countries for 1989 to 2013 as our baseline sample. We obtain detailed 
information on credit ratings and capital structures from the Capital IQ database, which 
provides extensive financial information for over 50,000 public and private firms around 
the world. We focus on publicly listed firms, as these firms are more likely to obtain public 
debt financing than private firms. Other financial data are collected from Compustat Global 
and North America, which cover most of the fundamental financial information on listed 
firms around the world. Legal variables that control for creditor rights are drawn from 
LLSV (1998) and Djankov et al. (2007). 
To be retained in the sample, a firm’s capital structure, credit rating, financial 
information and legal information must be listed in Capital IQ, Compustat and other 
sources like Djankov et al. (2007). We exclude financial firms and firms without positive 
book values of equity. Our final sample thus consists of 1,331 firms covering 51 countries. 
The number of firms per country ranges from 1 in Sri Lanka to 345 in the US as reported 
in Table A.1 of the Appendix.
We also control for systemic banking crises, as they may also influence firms' credit 
ratings or financing decisions. We follow Laeven and Valencia (2008, 2012) and refer to a 
systemic banking crisis occurring when a country's corporate and financial sectors 
experience several defaults. Table 1 presents descriptions of the variables used in this study.
[TABLE 1]
3.2  Variables
3.2.1 Measures of legal determinants
We mainly use the creditor rights index developed by Djankov et al. (2007) as a 
measure of the legal rights of creditors across countries. The index, which has been used 
9as a measure of creditor power and which has been demonstrated to remain remarkably 
stable over time, measures the number of laws and regulations that limit expropriation from 
secured lenders in a country. As Djankov et al. (2007) show, this aggregate index measures 
four actions of secured lenders under conditions of bankruptcy: (1) whether there are 
restrictions when a debtor files for reorganization; (2) whether secured creditors are able 
to obtain their collateral when reorganization is approved; (3) whether secured creditors 
are paid first out of proceeds derived from liquidating a bankrupt firm; and (4) whether an 
administrator (not a manager) is responsible for running the business during reorganization. 
Based on the above four features of the aggregate index, the subindices capture the four 
choices of secured lenders, which are written as CR1, CR2, CR3 and CR4 in this paper, 
respectively. A value of one is ascribed to the index when a country's laws and regulations 
offer each of these rights to secured lenders. The creditor rights index aggregates the scores 
and hence ranges from 0 (weakest creditor rights) to 4 (strongest creditor rights).
We also control for shareholder protection in our empirical investigations using the 
Corrected Anti-director Rights Index (Corrected ADRI) developed by Spamann (2010). 
The original anti-director rights index was first proposed by LLSV (1998), which 
aggregates six dimensions of shareholder protection rules. Of the six components, three are 
concerned with shareholder voting, including voting by mail, voting without blocking 
shares and calling an extraordinary meeting, the others are concerned with minority 
protection, including proportional board representation, preemptive rights and judicial 
remedies. Spamann (2010) further improves the index for leading local lawyers and 
developed a Corrected ADRI for forty-six countries.
3.2.2  Measures of credit rating
We first use the entity credit rating developed by Capital IQ to examine the effects of 
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national creditor rights on firms' credit ratings. In accordance with the literature we convert 
a firm's letter ratings to a numerical scale where 1 is equivalent to D, 2 is equivalent to 
CCC-, and the pattern continues. We also employ a rating change to analyze when creditor 
right improvements spur a credit rating upgrade. A credit rating change is formally defined 
as the difference in rating levels observed between the end and start of a year. We also 
differentiate between investment and speculative grade ratings. An Investment grade rating 
is a dummy variable equal to 1 when a rating exceeds BBB- (AAA to BBB-), and a 
Speculative grade rating is a dummy variable equal to 1 when a rating is less than BB+ 
(BB+ to D).
3.2.3 Measures of capital structure
Regarding capital structure, we focus on bond issuance relative to equity issuance. For 
each sampled firm, Capital IQ reports its total debt, different types of debt incurred and the 
amount of each type. With this database we can divide Total Debt into Term Loans, 
Revolving Credit, Senior Bonds and Notes, Subordinated Bonds and Notes, Commercial 
Paper, Capital Leases and Other Debt. To examine choices made between bond and equity 
issuance we construct two measures: the ratio of public debt to equity (bond/equity) and 
the ratio of senior public debt to equity (srbond/equity). Public debt is calculated as the 
sum of senior bonds and notes, subordinated bonds and notes and commercial paper; senior 
public debt refers to senior bonds and notes. We also use NETDIss, which is defined as the 
difference between the change in debt and the change in equity over total assets, rather than 
as the ratio of public debt to equity, to conduct a robustness check. 
3.2.4  Measures of investment and other firm variables
Following Baker et al. (2003) and Mclean et al. (2012), we define Investment as firm 
capital expenditures made over total assets. In our empirical tests we use firm-level controls 
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for firm size, profitability and liquidity. Firm size is the logarithm of total assets. To 
measure firm profitability we use Return on Assets (ROA), which denotes net earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization during year t divided by total assets at 
the close of year t-1. To measure firm liquidity conditions we use the Cash flow ratio, 
which is equal to net earnings determined after dividends in year t plus depreciation and 
amortization divided by total assets at the close of year t-1. Tangibility is measured as net 
property, plant and equity for year t divided by total assets at the close of year t-1. 
3.2.5  Banking crisis event window
In a systemic banking crisis, the number of nonperforming loans made increases 
dramatically and most aggregate banking system capital is quickly exhausted. A systemic 
banking crisis also always leads to output losses in the economy. In this work we use the 
starting dates of systemic banking crises provided by Laeven and Valencia (2012) though 
we focus only on those banking crises resulting in an output loss of over 10%, as we assume 
that only a significant banking crisis can lead to a credit rating change and shape firms' 
financing decisions. Based on these criteria and the database developed by Laeven and 
Valencia (2012) we identify 93 systemic banking crises occurring across countries from 
1989 to 2011. We mainly refer crisis episodes [t, t+3] as systemic banking crisis periods. 
3.2.6  Other national characteristics
We also control for potential effects of other national characteristics (GDP growth and 
Inflation) to isolate effects of macroeconomy volatility. GDP Growth is the annual growth 
rate of gross national product in current US dollars. Inflation is the annual growth rate of 
the consumer price index.
3.3 Descriptive statistics
      Tables 2 and 3 present descriptive statistics and correlations for the main variables used 
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in the following regression analyses. The statistics show high levels of heterogeneity. For 
instance, Creditor rights index values range from 0 to 4 with an average of 1.766, showing 
that there are more countries around the globe with lower creditor rights. The Corrected 
ADR index ranges from 2 to 6 with an average of 3.639. Changes in the creditor rights 
index (CRight change) range from -1 to 1 with an average of -0.003, showing that there 
have been more creditor right downgrades than upgrades in different countries over the last 
two decades. The Credit rating score ranges from 0 to 26 with a sample mean of 16.762 
and with a standard deviation of 3.905. Changes in rating scores (CRating change) range 
from -18 to 12 with a mean of -0.087 and with a standard deviation of 1.005. Regarding 
firm characteristics and operating performance, measures of Firm size range from 3.161 to 
21.776 with an average of 10.115; ROA values range from -1.339 to 0.885 with a mean of 
0.124; Cash flow to total assets values range from -1.507 to 1.375 with an average of 0.026. 
Investment values range from 0 to 0.874, implying that some firms make no investments 
in certain years. To limit potential effects of outliers, we winsorize firm-level variables at 
the 1% and 99% levels. 
[TABLE 2]
      Table 3 shows correlations between key variables examined in our study. The results 
first show that a country's level of creditor protection is highly and positively correlated 
with firm credit ratings, and an improvement in creditor protections is also highly and 
positively correlated with an improvement of firm credit ratings; second, firm investment 
is highly and positively correlated with creditor protections though the correlation between 
investment and credit ratings is not significant. 
[TABLE 3]
13
3.4 Empirical design
The baseline specification relating country-level creditor rights to firm-level 
credit ratings is as follows:
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑐 + 𝛼𝑙 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟_𝐴𝐷𝑅𝑐,𝑡 +
            (1)𝛽3 ∗ 𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
where  refers to credit ratings for firm i in year t; where   refers 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑐,𝑡
to the creditor rights index for country c in year t; and where   refers to the 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟_𝐴𝐷𝑅𝑐,𝑡
corrected anti-director rights index for country c in year t. In the regressions, we also 
employ the subindex of creditor rights, rather than the aggregated index, to measure 
robustness. is the constant term;  denotes year fixed effects;  denotes firm fixed 𝛼0 𝛼𝑡 𝛼𝑖
effects;  denotes industry fixed effects; and   denotes country fixed effects to account 𝛼𝑙 𝛼𝑐
for heterogeneities observed across time, firms, industries and countries. 
 denotes a set of country-level controls including GDP and CPI growth. 𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑐,𝑡
 denotes a series of time-varying firm characteristics including those of 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡
firm size, ROA and cash flows to assets.  is the error term.𝜀𝑖,𝑡
Our empirical tests revolve around equation (2), which is a revised and augmented 
version of equation (1) in that it uses credit rating changes as a dependent variable and 
credit rights change as the main explanatory variable while also including more additional 
interaction terms. 
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑐 + 𝛼𝑙 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡_𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗  
𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡_𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑐,𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑐,𝑡 +
               (2)𝛽5 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
where  refers to changes in credit rating scores; where 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡
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 refers to changes in the creditor rights index; and where  is the 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡_𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑐,𝑡 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑐,𝑡
systemic banking crisis dummy variable, which is equal to one in the first year of a crisis, 
t, in country c and for the next three years and which is equal to zero otherwise. 
To test translation of country-level creditor rights on firms’ capital structure choices 
made via the information channel provided by firm-level credit ratings, we estimate the 
following specification:
𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑/𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 (𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑐 + 𝛼𝑙 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑐,𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽4 ∗ 𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑐,𝑡 +
                                            (3)𝛽5 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
where  refers to the book value of the bonds to book value of equity for 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑/𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡
firm i in year t and where  refers to capital expenditures of firm i in year t. 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡
Throughout our analyses we use ordinary least squares (OLS) with heteroskedasticity 
robust standard errors clustered at the country level to account for potential correlations 
among firms within a country consistent with the recommendations of Petersen (2009)1.
4.    Empirical results
4.1  Baseline results
In this section, we present the main results derived from our baseline model. We 
regress credit ratings on the creditor rights index, on the shareholder rights index and on a 
set of control variables including country and firm characteristics. The results shown in 
columns (1) and (2) in Table 4 illustrate that coefficients on creditor rights are positive and 
statistically significant after controlling for time and firm fixed effects, indicating that in 
1 We also estimate our standard errors with additional clusters by either firm or year and find that the 
results still hold.
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countries with stronger creditor protections, firms tend to have higher credit ratings. The 
magnitude of the coefficients indicates that a one standard deviation increase in creditor 
rights improves firm credit rating scores by 0.704 holding all the other factors as constant. 
Results reported in columns (3) and (4) are derived from a regression supplemented with 
firm factors including firm size, ROA and cash flow ratios as well as country characteristics 
such as GDP growth and inflation. These findings show that the positive relation between 
creditor rights and credit ratings remains statistically significant after the inclusion of firm 
and country factors. In columns (5) to (8), we replace firm fixed effects in the regressions 
with industry and country fixed effects, and the main results still hold, and the coefficients 
of creditor rights remain nearly unaffected. Additionally, using the baseline model we also 
test the impact of shareholder rights on credit ratings. We include the corrected anti-
director rights index as a control variable in the baseline regression. We find that 
shareholder rights do not have a significant effect on credit ratings. 
[TABLE 4]
The firm-level regressions apply equal weight to each firm across countries and in 
the full sample. Given that a large number of firms are from the US and UK, the 
idiosyncratic aspects of the US or UK may drive our results. We check the robustness of 
our results in two ways: first, we estimate the regression with a subsample that excludes 
firms from these two countries and second, we estimate a weighted least squares (WLS) 
regression with the number of firms used as weights. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 report 
results derived from the subsample excluding US and UK firms. The coefficient on creditor 
rights remains statistically significant but is smaller in magnitude, suggesting that a one 
standard deviation increase in creditor rights improves a firm’s credit rating score by 0.268 
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holding all the other factors as constant. Our results also hold when employing WLS as 
shown in columns (3) and (4), in which coefficients on creditor rights are indeed 
economically larger. Overall, Table 5 shows that the association between creditor rights 
and firms' credit ratings is robust when controlling for potentially confounding factors in 
the full sample and in the subsample excluding US and UK firms. 
[TABLE 5]
Table 6 shows results derived from the subindex of creditor rights CR1, CR2, CR3 
and CR4 for robustness. CR1, CR2 and CR3 enter with positive and significant signs while 
CR4 enters with an insignificant sign, indicating that restrictions (e.g., creditor consent 
when a debtor files for reorganization, an automatic stay imposed by the court and creditors 
being paid first out of liquidation proceeds) matter for firms' credit ratings. On the other 
hand, court-appointed administration during business reorganization matter less. In this 
instance, we do not control for country fixed effects, as the subindices do not vary over 
time. Overall, we confirm a strong and positive association between country creditor 
protection and firm credit ratings. 
[TABLE 6]
4.2  Effects of changes in creditor rights
In Table 7 we present results derived from an estimation of equation (2), which 
relates the change observed in firm credit ratings to changes in country creditor protections. 
Column (1) shows that stronger country creditor rights tend to be associated with higher 
firm credit ratings after considering year and firm fixed effects. In terms of economic 
impact, a one unit increase in creditor rights tends to enhance changes in credit rating scores 
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by 0.781 when holding the other factors as constants. In column (2), we replace firm fixed 
effects with industry and country fixed effects. The results remain consistent, meaning that 
the effect of changes in creditor protections on changes in credit ratings remains 
statistically significant and economically meaningful after controlling for industry- and 
country-level heterogeneities. In column (3), we include a banking crisis dummy and its 
interaction with changes in creditor rights. We exclude GDP and CPI growth as 
independent variables, as they are highly correlated with the crisis dummy. All 
specifications account for time effects through the inclusion of year fixed effects. The 
results first show that during crises, firms tend to have lower credit ratings. Second, the 
coefficient of the interaction term between a change in creditor rights and the banking crisis 
dummy is positive and statistically significant.  This finding also suggests that during crises, 
the impact of improvements in creditor rights on credit ratings is amplified. We 
hypothesize that during systemic banking crises the accompanying economic downturn and 
resulting asset impairment magnifies the importance of creditor protections. The estimated 
coefficient observed suggests that an increase of one unit of creditor rights index change 
occurring during a crisis should enhance the change in credit scores by 0.956. In column 
(4), we exclude firm fixed effects to consider industry and country fixed effects; our results 
continue to hold. Overall, this finding suggests that country creditor protection is positively 
associated with firm credit ratings. 
[TABLE 7]
4.3 Creditor rights, credit ratings and capital structures
We now investigate how creditor rights interact with credit ratings to influence 
capital structure in terms of bond issuance relative to equity issuance. The power channel 
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of credit predicts an increase in a borrowers’ debt capacity when stronger creditor 
protections enable lenders to force repayment by seizing collateral. The information 
channel works through credit ratings to reinforce the power channel’s effect on the 
borrower’s debt capacity. Rating agencies perform a monitoring role on behalf of widely 
dispersed bond holders. Concurrently, demand for monitoring decreases, as managers have 
fewer incentives to take risks when creditor protections are strengthened (Acharya et al., 
2011b). Thus, strong creditor protections may affect firm financing decisions through both 
power and information channels, which is to say that creditor protection may directly 
influence the capital structure by making creditors more powerful in cases of bankruptcy 
or reorganization or through rating agencies' information disclosures. 
Table 8 shows the results of regressions using the model given in equation (3). In 
columns (1) to (2), we use bond/equity as the dependent variable, and in columns (3) and 
(4), we use srbond/equity as dependent variables for a robustness check. The main 
explanatory variables used are the creditor rights index and its interactions with firm credit 
ratings. We interact country creditor rights and firm credit ratings to measure how creditor 
protection affects capital structure through the information channel.  We also control for 
credit ratings, as they may have an effect on capital structure that is independent of creditor 
rights. For example, Kisgen (2006) shows that credit ratings are an important consideration 
in manager's financing decisions due to the discrete costs or benefits associated with 
obtaining different levels of ratings. The results shown in Table 8 illustrate that coefficients 
on creditor rights are positive but statistically insignificant, suggesting that after controlling 
for year, country and industry heterogeneities and other firm characteristics, the power 
channel alone is not strong enough to encourage firms to issue more debt relative to equity 
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in response to stronger creditor rights. The coefficient on the interaction term is positive 
and statistically significant, which suggests that in countries with more creditor protection, 
firms with higher credit ratings tend to issue more bonds relative to equity, indicating a 
strong and significant effect delivered through the information channel. Using 
srbond/equity as a dependent variable does not change our results, as shown in columns 
(3) and (4). Moreover, the interaction term enters with an economically larger coefficient, 
suggesting that the information channel effect is stronger for senior bond issuance than for 
equity issuance. Overall these results confirm that the impact of country creditor rights on 
firm bond issuance through the information channel is statistically significant and 
economically meaningful.
[TABLE 8]
To further explore heterogenous effects observed through the informational 
channel, we divide our sample into countries with different degrees of information 
asymmetry. Previous studies suggest that rating criteria used for firms in less developed 
countries differ from those used for firms in developed countries due to differences in 
information asymmetries (e.g. Shen, Huang and Hasan, 2012). As in Shen et al., we proxy 
the degree of information asymmetry by income and divide our sample into high- and low-
income countries using the World Bank’s definition of national income. High-income 
countries are expected to present low levels of information asymmetry, while low-income 
countries are expected to present high levels of information asymmetry. Columns (5) and 
(6) show the corresponding results with bond/equity used as the dependent variable. We 
find that coefficients on the interaction term are only statistically significant for high-
income countries, where information asymmetries are expected to be low. The coefficient 
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is also economically larger for high-income countries. The Chi-sq. test results (p-value of 
0.4852) do not suggest a statistically significant difference in economic impact. Overall, 
the results given in Table 8 confirm that country-level creditor protections are translated 
into firm-level decisions to issue bonds through information channels supplied by firm-
level credit ratings and that such an effect is more significant when levels of country 
information asymmetry are low and when information transfer is more complete.
However, it may still be that it is not country-level creditor rights but other 
unobserved country heterogeneities that drive these results. To address potential 
endogeneities and to offer causal evidence, we exploit country-level exogenous changes in 
creditor rights and employ a difference-in-difference strategy following Acharya and 
Subramanian (2009). Over our sample period, seven countries (Canada, Finland, Indonesia, 
Russia, Israel, India and Sweden) experienced a decline in creditor rights index values by 
one unit2. Table A.2 lists these countries and the years in which changes to creditor rights 
were made. These are considered ‘treated’ countries while countries that did not experience 
such a change in creditor rights during the same time period are defined as ‘control’ 
countries. We compare changes in capital structures for firms in the two sets of countries. 
Due to a paucity of observations with data available to construct a bond/equity ratio for the 
control sample, here we use NETDIss, defined as firms’ net debt issuance over total assets, 
as a dependent variable. Corresponding results are presented in Table 9. , the 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡
difference-in-difference estimator, takes a value of 1(0) for years following a decline in 
creditor rights for the treated (control) countries. In column (1), we use the full sample for 
2 Ireland also experienced a one unit decrease in the creditor rights index in 1990 in our sample period. 
However, we did not include it into our treated sample, as we do not have enough observations for the 
period preceding the treatment for Ireland. 
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the regression. Consistent with our hypothesis the results show that after a decline in 
creditor protection, net debt issuance in treated countries is significantly lower than that 
observed in control countries, suggesting a positive association between creditor rights and 
debt issuance. To address any residual omitted variable bias that may remain, we employ 
a one-to-one propensity score matching algorithm to define control countries based on 
GDP per capita, GDP growth, CPI growth and firm size. Column (2) shows results derived 
from the matched sample. The coefficient on After continues to be negative and statistically 
significant with a higher absolute value, suggesting that weaker creditor rights reduce firms’ 
net debt issuance more for the matched sample. Overall the results shown in columns (1) 
and (2) confirm the positive impact of creditor rights on net debt issuance. 
[TABLE 9]
To further examine the impact through the information channel, we divide our 
sample into high- vs. low-income countries. As is shown above, information asymmetries 
are expected to be less significant in high-income countries (Shen, Huang and Hasan, 2012). 
Therefore, the information channel should be stronger in translating stronger creditor rights 
to net debt issuance among high-income countries. In columns (3) and (4) we find results 
consistent with our hypotheses. The coefficients of After are significantly negative for both 
subsamples of high- and low-income countries; however, the absolute value is significantly 
larger for the subsample of high-income countries (-0.0515 vs. -0.0135). The Chi-sq. test 
of the coefficient suggests that such difference in economic impact is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. These results offer further causal evidence of the impact of 
creditor rights on net debt issuance through the information channel. 
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5. Creditor rights, ratings and investments 
We next examine whether there is support for Hypothesis 3A that creditor 
protections and credit ratings interact to influence firm investment decisions. We estimate 
equation (3) with firm investment used as a dependent variable. The coefficient estimate 
of the interaction term between creditor rights and credit ratings captures the extent to 
which firm investments are influenced by creditor rights through the information channel.  
For all of the specifications we control for country, year, and industry heterogeneity, as 
well as for other macro controls, and firm characteristics, such as levels of tangibility. Table 
10 reports the results. In column (1) we use the full sample for the regression. The results 
suggest that stronger creditor rights affect firm investments through the power and 
information channels. The coefficient on creditor rights is positive and significant, 
suggesting that stronger creditor rights improve firm capital expenditure overall. Moreover, 
the interaction term of creditor rights and credit ratings enters with a significant and 
positive sign, showing that creditor rights significantly affect firm investments through the 
information channel.  
We extend the analyses and examine cross-sectional variations in investment 
reactions. Given the robust evidence on information effects of creditor protection through 
ratings on firms' investment decisions, we examine whether information disclosure truly 
benefits bondholders. According to Hypothesis 3B we should find that firms with more 
severe bondholder-stockholder conflicts should exhibit stronger investment responses. 
Based on the seminal work of Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers (1977) and Smith and 
Warner (1979) we assume that firms of low credit quality face stronger bondholder-
stockholder conflicts than firms of impeccable credit quality. Therefore, we employ a 
dummy for speculative-grade ratings as a proxy for agency conflicts and then divide the 
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full sample into firms with investment-grade ratings and firms with speculative-grade 
ratings. The regressions also incorporate country, year and industry fixed effects. The 
results given in columns (2) and (3) of Table 10 show that the coefficients of creditor rights 
are not significant for high- or low-rated firms. However, the interaction term enters 
positively and significantly into the sample of firms with speculative-grade ratings but 
insignificantly into the other sample, which suggests that for firms of low credit quality 
and experiencing more severe bondholder-stockholder conflicts, the effects of creditor 
protections on firm investments are more dependent on the monitoring and information 
disclosure functions of credit ratings.  
[TABLE 10]
De Jong, Kabir and Nguyen (2008) show that asset tangibility can have a positive 
impact on firm leverage, which introduces an endogeneity bias into the above results. To 
address this concern, we run regressions using a two-stage model with the results presented 
in Table 11. In the first stage, the dependent variable used is Investment, and the key 
explanatory variable used is Leverage as shown in column (1). The residual from the first-
stage regression becomes the dependent variable in the second-stage regression, which is 
shown in column (2). Using the two-staged procedure we isolate the impact of leverage on 
net fixed investments. The results given in column (2) show that the coefficient on the 
interaction term between creditor rights and credit ratings remains positive and statistically 
significant.  This evidence confirms that the impact of creditor rights on firm investment 
through the information channel is robust to potential endogeneities introduced by a 
positive association between leverage and firm capital expenditures.
[TABLE 11]
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6. Conclusions
This paper demonstrates the important role of credit ratings in translating stronger 
creditor protections into greater reliance on public debt.  Previous studies have examined 
the role of the power channel of credit (Aghion and Bolton, 1992) in encouraging the 
issuance of private debt following the strengthening of creditor rights.  We argue that a 
second channel, the information channel, works through the intermediation of credit rating 
agencies, which efficiently monitor a firm to disseminate information to bond holders. In 
combination with the power channel concentrating more power into the hands of creditors 
and the information channel offering efficient monitoring, firms are encouraged to issue 
bonds relative to equity. We further find that the information channel allows firms to 
increase capital expenditures when creditor rights are strengthened. As further evidence of 
credit ratings fulfilling information functions, our results are enhanced for firms facing a 
pronounced agency problem.  These results have broader policy implications. Countries 
that wish to encourage firms to diversify their lending sources should strengthen creditor 
rights which, as our study shows, encourages firms to issue corporate debt.
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1Table 1 Definitions of the main variables
This table lists the variables, definitions and data sources used.
Variable Definition Source
Country Characteristics
Law
Creditor rights index An index aggregating creditor rights. The index ranges from 0 (weakest creditor 
rights) to 4 (strongest creditor rights)
Djankov et al. (2007)
CR1 A subindex of creditor rights in terms of reorganization approval. The index ranges 
from 0 (weakest creditor rights) to 4 (strongest creditor rights)
CR2 A subindex of creditor rights in terms of whether secured creditors are able to obtain 
their collateral when reorganization is approved. The index ranges from 0 (weakest 
creditor rights) to 4 (strongest creditor rights)
CR3 A subindex of creditor rights in terms of whether secured creditors are paid first. The 
index ranges from 0 (weakest creditor rights) to 4 (strongest creditor rights)
CR4 A subindex of creditor rights in terms of whether a magager would be out. The index 
ranges from 0 (weakest creditor rights) to 4 (strongest creditor rights)
Corrected anti-director rights index 
(Corrected ADRI)
An additional corrected index of the original anti-director rights index based on 
improved data collection, coding and documentation methods
Spamann (2010)
Crises
Systemic banking crisis dummy Equal to one in the first year of a crisis and three years after Laeven and Valencia 
(2012)
Macroeconomic control variables
GDP growth Growth rate of gross national product (current US dollars) WDI 
CPI growth Inflation rate WDI
Firm Characteristics
Credit rating score Equal to 1 for a ratings of D up to a value of 23 for a rating of AAA+ S&P Capital IQ
Credit rating Long-term credit rating ranging from D to AAA+ S&P Capital IQ
Firm size Natural logarithm of total assets Compustat Global
ROA EBITDA (Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization)/total assets Compustat Global
Cash flow to assets (Income before extraordinary items + Depreciation and Amortization)/total assets Compustat Global
Investment Capital expenditures/total assets Compustat Global
Leverage Total debt/total assets Compustat Global
Tangibility Net property, plant, and equipment/total assets Compustat Global
2Public debt Senior bonds and notes + subordinated bonds and notes + commercial paper S&P Capital IQ
Senior public debt Senior bonds and notes S&P Capital IQ
Bond to equity Public debt /common equity S&P Capital IQ
Senior bond to equity Senior public debt / common equity S&P Capital IQ
NETDIss ( ) / total assets∆Debt ‒ ∆Equity S&P Capital IQ
3Table 2  Summary statistics
This table reports summary statistics for the main variables. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Creditor rights 16,129 1.766 1.070 0 4
Corrected ADRI 15,323 3.639 1.291 2 6
Credit rating 16,855 16.762 3.905 0 26
CRight change 16,502 -0.003 0.070 -1 1
CRating change 15,529 -0.087 1.005 -18 12
NETDIss 16,830 -0.002 0.083 -2.914 2.460
Firm size 16,830 10.115 2.742 3.161 21.776
ROA 16,811 0.124 0.079 -1.339 0.885
Cash flow to assets 16,830 0.026 0.065 -1.507 1.375
Investment 4,400 0.066 0.058 0.000 0.874
Tangibility 4,499 0.389 0.238 0.023 0.886
4Table 3 Correlation
This table reports correlations of the main variables.
Creditor 
rights
Corrected 
ADRI
Credit 
rating
CRight 
change
CRating 
change
Firm size ROA CF ratio Investment Tangibility
Creditor rights 1.0000
Corr ADR 0.5594* 1.0000
(0.0000)
Credit rating 0.2294* 0.2836* 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
CRight change -0.0010 -0.0704* -0.0135 1.0000
(0.8931) (0.0000) (0.0000)
CRating change 0.0088 0.0394* 0.4358* 0.0477* 1.0000
(0.3081) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Firm size 0.1471* 0.4888* 0.2333* -0.0501* 0.0931* 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
ROA -0.0042 -0.0581* 0.2163* 0.0375* 0.2296 * -0.0246 1.0000
(0.7792) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0127) (0.0000) (0.0000)
CF ratio -0.1608* -0.3096* 0.1790* 0.0225 0.1350* -0.1461* 0.3080* 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1253) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Investment 0.0569* -0.0094 0.0312 0.0172 0.0746* -0.0158 0.2476* 0.0621* 1.0000
(0.0002) (0.5543) (0.0382) (0.2625) (0.0001) (0.2954) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Tangibility 0.0275 -0.0408* -0.0044 -0.0407* -0.0730* -0.0328* 0.0473* 0.0030 0.2621* 1.0000
(0.0711) (0.0092) (0.7660) (0.0071) (0.0000) (0.0277) (0.0015) (0.8425) (0.0000)
5Table 4  Creditor rights and credit ratings: baseline results
This table reports the results of the regression:
. The Credit ratingi,t = α0 + αt + αi + αl + αc + β1 ∗ Creditor rightsc,t + β2 ∗ Corrected ADRc,t + β3 ∗ Macro_controlsc,t + β4 ∗ Firm_controlsi,t + εi,t
dependent variable is firms' credit ratings. i index firms, l index industries, c index countries and t index year;  and  𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑐,𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟ected 𝐴𝐷𝑅𝑐,𝑡
denote countries' creditor and shareholder protections, respectively;  include country-level GDP growth and CPI growth; 𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑐,𝑡
 include firm-level firm sizes, ROA and cashflow ratios;  denote year, country, industry and firm fixed effects, 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡  𝛼𝑡, 𝛼𝑐, 𝛼𝑙  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛼𝑖
respectively;  is the error term covering unobservable shocks that affect firm credit ratings. All variables are defined in Table 1. Robust standard errors 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * imply significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Dep. Var. Credit rating
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Creditor rights 0.658*** 0.283** 0.680*** 0.289**
 (0.118) (0.113) (0.118) (0.113)
Corrected ADR 0.0973 0.102* 0.0899 0.105*
 (0.0617) (0.0579) (0.0615) (0.0582)
GDP growth 0.0525*** 0.0718*** 0.0513*** 0.0697***
 (0.00828) (0.00918) (0.00835) (0.00926)
CPI growth -0.0626*** -0.0633*** -0.0633*** -0.0653***
 (0.00474) (0.00703) (0.00478) (0.00707)
Firm size 0.596*** 0.611*** 0.658*** 0.697***
(0.0196) (0.0221) (0.0181) (0.0202)
ROA 3.200*** 3.204*** 3.811*** 3.836***
(0.231) (0.241) (0.230) (0.240)
CF ratio 1.826*** 1.814*** 1.969*** 1.941***
(0.253) (0.249) (0.254) (0.251)
Cons 16.88*** 17.97*** 11.67*** 11.88*** 17.26*** 9.304*** 11.03*** 11.43***
 (0.302) (0.299) (0.338) (0.355) (1.769) (0.940) (1.417) (0.523)
Country FE N N N N Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
6Gsector FE N N N N Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y N N N N
R-sq. 0.1403 0.1544 0.2183 0.2214 0.1404 0.1549 0.2171 0.2203
# of Obs. 16,129 15,323 15,715 14,914 16,129 15,323 15,715 14,914
7Table 5  Creditor rights and credit ratings: excluding US and UK firms and WLS
This table reports the results of the regression:Credit ratingi,t = α0 + αt + αi + αl + αc + β1 ∗ Creditor rightsc,t + β2 ∗ Corrected ADRc,t +
. The dependent variable is firms' credit ratings. i β3 ∗ Macro_controlsc,t + β4 ∗ Firm_controlsi,t + εi,t
index firms, l index industries, c index countries and t index year. The key explanatory variable is the 
creditor rights index. All variables are defined in Table 1. Columns (1) and (2) report results derived from 
the sample excluding U.S. and U.K. companies. Columns (3) and (4) report results derived from the 
weighted least square regressions by firm number to account for the large number of U.S. and U.K. 
companies in our sample. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * imply 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Dep. Var. Credit rating
Sample excl. US and UK firms Weighted least squares
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Creditor rights 0.250** 0.904***
 (0.116) (0.199)
Corrected ADR 0.215 -0.460***
 (0.165) (0.129)
GDP growth 0.0402*** 0.0639*** 0.0416 0.0132
 (0.00847) (0.00938) (0.0325) (0.0339)
CPI growth -0.0590*** -0.0567*** -0.0278 0.0261
 (0.00467) (0.00689) (0.0183) (0.0295)
Firm size 0.522*** 0.515*** 1.061*** 1.065***
(0.0197) (0.0227) (0.0289) (0.0290)
ROA 3.354*** 3.350*** 13.17*** 13.18***
(0.271) (0.289) (1.646) (1.652)
CF ratio 1.473*** 1.453*** 4.507*** 4.497***
(0.525) (0.509) (1.521) (1.521)
Cons 13.41*** 13.69*** 4.879*** 9.066***
(1.594) (0.745) (1.007) (0.756)
Country FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Gsector FE Y Y Y Y
Firm FE N N N N
R-sq. 0.1801 0.1736 0.4661 0.4653
# of Obs. 10,198 9,397 13,850 13,173
8Table 6  Creditor rights and credit rating: robustness
This table reports the results of the regression:Credit ratingi,t = α0 + αt + αi + αl + αc + β1 ∗ Creditor rightsc,t + β2 ∗ Corrected ADRc,t +
. The dependent variable is firms' credit ratings. i β3 ∗ Macro_controlsc,t + β4 ∗ Firm_controlsi,t + εi,t
index firms, c index countries and t index year. The key explanatory variable is the subindices of 
creditor rights, CR1, CR2, CR3 and CR4. All variables are defined in Table 1. Robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * imply significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Dep. Var. Credit rating
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CR1(Reorg) 0.442**
 (0.196)
CR2 (Autostay) 0.894***
 (0.162)
CR3 (Secured) 1.025***
 (0.205)
CR4 (Manages) -0.00183
(0.154)
GDP growth 0.0304*** 0.0292*** 0.0319*** 0.0313***
 (0.00819) (0.00819) (0.00818) (0.00819)
CPI growth -0.0783*** -0.0786*** -0.0758*** -0.0775***
 (0.00466) (0.00465) (0.00466) (0.00465)
Firm size 0.551*** 0.556*** 0.546*** 0.549***
 (0.0161) (0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0165)
ROA 3.546*** 3.556*** 3.559*** 3.551***
 (0.231) (0.231) (0.231) (0.231)
CF ratio 2.069*** 2.121*** 1.998*** 2.043***
 (0.254) (0.254) (0.254) (0.254)
Cons 11.68*** 11.53*** 11.05*** 11.82***
 (0.379) (0.374) (0.405) (0.376)
Country FE N N N N
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Gsector FE Y Y Y Y
Firm FE N N N N
R-sq. 0.2430 0.2561 0.2507 0.2411
# of Obs. 15,735 15,735 15,735 15,735
9Table 7  Effects of creditor right changes
This table reports the effects of creditor right changes on credit rating changes in all periods and over 
crisis episodes [t, t+3] where t is the starting year of a systemic banking crisis defined in Laeven and 
Valencia (2012). The dependent variable is the change in firms’ credit ratings. The key variable is the 
change in creditor rights and corresponding interactions with crises. All variables are defined in Table 
1. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * imply significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively.
Dep. Var. Credit rating change
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CRight change 0.781*** 0.828*** 0.322* 0.375*
 (0.203) (0.196) (0.160) (0.194)
CRight change * Crisis 0.956** 0.912**
 (0.457) (0.444)
Crisis -0.102* -0.103**
 (0.0535) (0.0455)
GDP growth 0.0487*** 0.0483*** - -
 (0.00936) (0.00894) - -
CPI growth -0.0412*** -0.0381*** - -
 (0.0102) (0.00952) - -
Firm size -0.00730 -0.000838 -0.0108 0.000757
 (0.0192) (0.00494) (0.0187) (0.00553)
ROA 1.780*** 1.281*** 1.987*** 1.396***
 (0.410) (0.231) (0.548) (0.275)
CF ratio 1.634*** 1.298*** 1.850*** 1.393***
 (0.542) (0.391) (0.682) (0.472)
Cons -0.112 -0.669*** -0.252 -0.410***
 (0.241) (0.248) (0.238) (0.154)
Country FE N Y N Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Gsector FE N Y N Y
Firm FE Y N Y N
R-sq. 0.0642 0.0631 0.0477 0.0464
# of Obs. 14,566 14,566 11,797 11,797
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Table 8  Creditor rights, credit ratings and capital structures
This table reports results of regression𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑_𝑡𝑜_𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = α0 + αt + αi + αl + αc + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑐,𝑡 +
. i index 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑐,𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
firms, l index industries, c index countries and t index year. The dependent variable denotes firm bond 
value to equity value or senior bond value to equity value. The key explanatory variable is the creditor 
right index and its interaction with firm credit ratings. All variables are defined in Table 1. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * imply significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively.
Dep. Var. Bond/equity Srbond/equity Bond/equity
Full sample High 
income
Low 
income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Creditor rights 0.228 0.166 1.081 0.172 -0.0987 -1.708
(1.599) (0.392) (2.619) (0.972) (5.549) (5.785)
Credit rating -0.456*** -0.708*** -1.634*** -0.359
(0.176) (0.270) (0.592) (0.342)
CRight * CRating 0.230** 0.362** 0.637*** 0.224
(0.0939) (0.143) (0.222) (0.313)
Firm size -0.235 -0.102 -0.424 -0.192 -1.811* 0.546*
(0.250) (0.296) (0.389) (0.468) (1.094) (0.290)
ROA -11.57** -11.86* -18.80** -17.75* -11.66 -3.317
(5.739) (6.158) (8.799) (9.710) (16.86) (6.314)
CF ratio 1.580 3.244 2.802 4.571 16.31 -1.320
(4.859) (4.891) (6.596) (6.623) (34.68) (4.150)
Cons 3.499 9.659 4.455 13.57 - 2.764
(11.47) (11.96) (19.54) (20.10) - (10.38)
Chi-sq. 0.49
(P-value) (0.4852)
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Gsector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE N N N N N N
R-sq. 0.0203 0.0248 0.0292 0.0364 0.0741 0.0231
# of Obs. 1,725 1,725 1,127 1,127 540 905
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Table 9  Creditor rights, credit ratings and capital structures: Difference-in-difference
This table reports the robustness results for creditor rights, credit ratings and capital structures using a 
difference-in-difference strategy. The regression is
. The dependent variable is 𝑁𝐸𝑇𝐷𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = α0 + αt + αl + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
firms’ net debt issuance over total assets. i index firms, l index industry, c index countries and t index 
year. The key explanatory variable is , which is equal to one for years following a decrease in 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐,𝑡
creditor rights for treated countries or which is equal to zero otherwise. The matched sample is defined 
by a one-to-one propensity score matching algorithm based on country characteristics (log of GDP per 
capita, GDP growth, and CPI growth) and firm sizes. All variables are defined in Table 1. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * imply significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively.
Dep. Var. NETDIss
Full sample Matched sample High income Low income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
After -0.0251* -0.0341** -0.0515*** -0.0135***
 (0.0120) (0.0153) (0.00739) (0.00485)
Firm size 0.115 0.00210 0.00816*** 0.00132
 (0.185) (0.00280) (0.00199) (0.00348)
ROA 3.799*** -0.0133 0.301*** -0.0147
 (0.675) (0.0192) (0.0816) (0.0201)
CF ratio 0.0655 0.0128 0.104 0.0126
 (0.0879) (0.0186) (0.0633) (0.0186)
Cons -4.830 -0.00462 -0.0710** -0.000459
 (5.267) (0.0221) (0.0277) (0.0260)
Chi-sq. 19.05***
(P-value) (0.000)
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Country FE N N N N
Gsector FE Y Y Y Y
Firm FE N N N N
R-sq. 0.0189 0.0196 0.1650 0.0172
# of Obs. 271,616 55,034 9,772 42,628
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Table 10  Creditor rights, credit ratings and firm investments
This table reports the results of regression 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = α0 + αt + αi + αl + αc + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑐,𝑡 +
𝛽2 ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑐,𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
. The dependent variable is firm investments. i index firms, l index 𝛽5 ∗ 𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
industries, c index countries and t index year. Key explanatory variables are creditor rights and their 
interactions with credit ratings. All variables are defined in Table 1. Robust standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. ***, ** and * imply significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Dep. Var. Investment
 Full sample Investment grade Speculative grade
(1) (2) (3)
Creditor rights 0.00622** 0.0110 -0.00405
(0.00227) (0.0123) (0.0140)
Credit rating 0.00161*** - -
(0.000403) - -
CRight * CRating 0.000412* 0.000130 0.00116**
(0.000217) (0.000223) (0.000538)
Tangibility 0.0250** 0.0443*** 0.0145
(0.0110) (0.0112) (0.0171)
CF ratio -0.00905 -0.00177 -0.0116
(0.0181) (0.0113) (0.0223)
ROA 0.0904*** 0.149*** 0.0540**
(0.0181) (0.0198) (0.0273)
Firm size -0.00136 0.000651 -0.00159
(0.000825) (0.000892) (0.00152)
GDP growth 0.000849 -0.000830 0.00207***
(0.000651) (0.000992) (0.000780)
CPI growth -0.000199 0.000720 -0.0000296
(0.000408) (0.00102) (0.000496)
Cons 0.154*** 0.0824*** 0.212***
(0.0173) (0.0237) (0.0325)
Country FE Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y
Gsector FE Y Y Y
Firm FE N N N
R-sq (within) 0.2531 0.3103 0.2877
# of Obs. 4,058 2,462 1,596
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Table 11  Creditor rights, credit ratings and firm investments: robustness
This table reports the results for regressions of the two-stage model. In the first stage, the dependent 
variable is firm investment; in the second stage, the dependent variable is the residual of the first 
stage. Key explanatory variables are creditor rights and their interactions with credit ratings. All 
variables are defined in Table 1. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
imply significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Dep. Var. Investment Resid
(1) (2)
Leverage 0.00116
(0.000827)
Creditor rights 0.00996
(0.00757)
CRight * CRating 0.000486**
(0.000226)
Credit rating 0.00176***
(0.000379)
CF ratio 0.00482 -0.0186
(0.0210) (0.0180)
ROA 0.100*** -0.00285
(0.0233) (0.0191)
Firm size -0.00161* -0.0000918
(0.000807) (0.000769)
GDP growth 0.000773 0.0000949
(0.000755) (0.000660)
CPI growth -0.000752* 0.000570
(0.000440) (0.000395)
Cons 0.194*** -0.0335**
(0.0115) (0.0161)
Country FE Y Y
Year FE Y Y
Gsector FE Y Y
Firm FE N N
R-sq. 0.2331 0.0244
# of Obs. 4,100 4,094
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Appendix:
Table A.1  List of countries and number of firms
Country Number of firms Country Number of firms
Argentina 12 Lithuania 1
Australia 61 Malaysia 8
Austria 6 Mexico 34
Belgium 8 Netherlands 28
Brazil 41 New Zealand 13
Bulgaria 1 Nigeria 1
Canada 28 Norway 9
Chile 15 Philippines 6
China 9 Poland 4
Colombia 2 Portugal 4
Czech Republic 3 Russian Federation 24
Denmark 3 Saudi Arabia 2
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2 Singapore 9
Finland 9 South Africa 6
France 56 Spain 12
Germany 46 Sri Lanka 1
Greece 3 Sweden 23
Hungary 2 Switzerland 27
India 11 Thailand 11
Indonesia 25 Turkey 5
Ireland 9 Ukraine 1
Israel 1 United Arab Emirates 3
Italy 24 United Kingdom 105
Japan 244 United States 345
Kazakhstan 2 Venezuela, RB 2
Korea, Rep. 24 TOTAL 1,331
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Table A.2 Countries that underwent a decline in creditor rights over the sample period
Country name Year of decrease
Canada 1992
Finland 1993
Indonesia 1998
Israel 1995
India 1993
Sweden 1995
Russian Federation 1998
